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HUMANITARIAN LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT IN SWEDEN:
OGLING THE SOCIALIST CAMP
by
JACOB W. F. SUNDBERG*
I. SWEDEN - A COUNTRY SURROUNDED?
T HE INHABITANTS OF A country with the military-geographical location of
Sweden should find it natural, one would think, to consider extensively
the political and legal-philosophical message of the world which surrounds the
country, most conspicuously to the east and to the south, and, by navies below
the horizon, less conspicuously to the north and to the west. Everywhere is
the Socialist Camp - a not unlikely adversary in some future conflict. In
Sweden, however, there prevails a surprising reluctance to discuss the realities
of the Camp. To say the least, such discussion is up-hill work. Looking for
the reasons why, a few things stand out. Many top people suffer from the Ham-
marskiold complex: they need the Socialist assent to their international designs
and feel that they cannot afford to upset the leaders in the Camp. Mass media
are massively uninterested. With few exceptions, the scholarly world looks
resolutely the other way. A Royal Academy may even refuse to publish the
papers of one of its own members if he has addressed too directly the issues
which Swedes would prefer did not exist.1
What happens in a scientific academy is, of course, the most extreme ex-
pression of this don't-rock-the-boat mentality. However, when the same men-
tality permeates Swedish society in general and the mass media in particular,
it comes to influence deeply Swedish thinking on a number of international
law points. For instance, while there is, in Switzerland, a vivid discussion of
what neutrality signifies in a post-war world dominated in so many ways by
the United Nations Organization and whether neutrality is reconcileable with
UN membership,' Swedes feel very uncomfortable discussing such issues at
all, in spite of their UN membership and all their talk about neutrality. Swedes
prefer not even to mention the Swiss and the Austrian discussion of the issues.3
*Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Stockholm.
'This was the fate of the Swedish version of the paper which the author (who in 1967 was elected
corresponding member of KungL Orlogsmannasallskapet) contributed to the Professional Studies Conference
on the Humanitarian Laws of Armed Conflict at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 26-28 November
1979, and which he subsequently submitted for publication in the Academy periodical TIDSKRIFT I
SJOVASENDET.
'See, e.g., Henggeler, "Ist das schweizerische Neutralitatsstatut mit der Uno Mitgliedschaft vereinbar?",
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 3 December 1982, p. 25; Diez, "Stellungsnahme des Departements fur Aus Jartige
Angelegenheiten." Id.
'A comparative discussion of the legal issues in the Swiss, the Austrian and the Swedish neutrality claims
was offered in my article, Sundberg, Neutralitet - finns det?, 1971 SVENSK JURISrTIDNING 321, 338 ff,
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One would believe a citation cartel had been set up.4 Mass media however,
- as I will shortly try to prove - have seen to it that most Swedes do not
even know about the issues.
The mass media world is not easy to fathom. You may be able to indicate
what was written, you may have a feeling about what was not written, but
the burden of proof weighs heavily upon the observer who is rash enough to
venture a statement that something is so in mass media. I believe I can show,
however, by a rather simple device that has a bearing upon the theme of this
article, the very anti-legalist attitude of Swedish mass media.
Legal issues facing prisoners of war have been made to surface in the general
debate by some specific international cases. This happened when the trium-
phant Socialist forces put Colonel Callan and his men to trial in Luanda, Angola,
as "mercenaries" in 1976. It happened again when Captain Alfredo Astiz was
taken prisoner of war by the British in the Falklands war in 1982, reviving in-
terest in his involvement in the previous Argentinian troubles where he was
accused of having practiced torture, one of the alleged victims being a young
Swedish woman, Dagmar Hagelin. If you compare first class Swedish press
coverage with that of corresponding English and American papers, it stands
out how massively uninterested the Swedish mass media were in the legal issues
which were given prominent coverage in the Anglo-American press.' In all
likelihood, the legal issues were not even understood by the Swedish mass media
people and consequently ignored - just as the laws of neutrality and the legal
concepts of the Socialist Camp have been deliberately ignored.
This background makes it an intensely interesting but delicate task for
a Swedish scholar to address problems arising from the Additional Protocols
signed in Geneva in 1977, relating to the humanitarian laws of armed conflict.
but it failed to inspire any further discussion. No Swedish work dealing with neutrality is listed in the
guide Regner, SVENSK JURIDISK LITTERATUR III (Stockholm 1980), p. 34, covering the period 1971-1978.
The only attempt otherwise to come to grips with the UN problem seems to be the second edition of N.
ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY 1914-1941, (2d. ed. 1971) which has a new chapter called "Non-
Alignment and Neutrality Since 1952." )rvik is of Norwegian descent.
'Citation cartels become prevalent in Swedish legal literature in the 70s.
'A research project focusing on the discrepancies in coverage, and attempting to explain the Swedish anti-
legalism, is under way at the Faculty of Law, University of Stockholm. The researcher, Miss Ann-Cathrine
Nilsson, has felt able to submit the conclusions in the text, ahead of completing the study.
'INT'L. COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [I.C.R.C.], PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUG. 1949 (1977), [hereinafter cited as ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
these Protocols purport to provide for the protection of civilians, prisoners of war, civil defense personnel,
medical personnel, and medical transports. The Protocols also prohibit the use of certain methods and
means of warfare, and provide for the punishment of war criminals.
These Protocols are "additional" to the four existing Geneva Conventions of 1949. Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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At the outset, the Geneva Conference which produced these Protocols was
dominated by "the Vietnam syndrome."' In no country - not even the Soviet
Union - was the foreign policy so exclusively geared to securing victory for
the Communists in Vietnam as in Sweden. 8 It was inevitable that this should
make a deep imprint on the Swedish participation in the Geneva Conference.
The disastrous consequences of the victory of May 1, 1975, only worked to
reinforce among Swedes an iron will to insist that the foreign policy commit-
ment had been right all along.' As a side effect the consequences of Sweden's
military-geographical location were completely overshadowed by the preoccupa-
tion with Vietnam.
The Geneva Conference was very much run by Dr. Hans Blix who later,
by political accident, became for a while the Foreign Minister of Sweden. As
a result, Sweden is one of the countries that has ratified the Additional Pro-
tocols, and the Swedish authorities have worked hard to implement them. Sup-
port having been called in from abroad at an early stage, a British political
scientist, Dr. Adam Roberts, Lecturer in International Relations at the Lon-
don School of Economics, was commissioned by the Swedish authorities to
contribute a study on "Occupation, Resistance and Law."II The implementa-
tion work started with setting up a government committee -
Folkrdttskommittn - charged with taking care of the matter. In the Cabinet
Protocol of June 29, 1978, by which the Committee was created, it was re-
quested to consider Dr. Roberts' results."I Presumably because Swedish ex-
perts had turned out to be rather skeptical, one Norwegian citizen, Professor
'The expression is fetched from Reed, Laws of War. The Developing Law of Armed Conflict - Some
Current Problems, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 17, 21 (1977).
'The Swedish commitment was reported to have forced the Soviet Union to make an even greater support
effort than they had intended. See E. CARLSSON, GOTEBORGS HANDELS OCH SJOFARTSTIDNING, (1973),
referring to "well-informed sources in Hanoi."
'Feeling trapped by the predictable (and predicted) massacre of close to three million people in Cambodia,
half a million in concentration camps in Vietnam, and another half a million preferring to risk their lives
at sea to enduring the "social progress" in Vietnam, Swedes in general have preferred to look the other
way (although joining the criticism of Israel for not having predicted and prevented the massacres in the
Palestinian camps in Lebanon which took place during the summer of 1982 carried out by Christian Falangist
personnel). Consequently, in Sweden today there is nothing to match the effort of leftists in Finland to
find out what really took place in Cambodia, resulting in the publication of the semi-official report
KAMPUTCHEA IN THE SEVENTIES (1982) (financed by the Finnish Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of
Education, the Academy of Finland, and others).
"See A. Roberts, Occupation, Resistance and Law - International Law on Military Occupation and
Resistance, F6RSVARETS FORSKNINGSANSTALT HUVUDAVDELNING 1 (1980). Incidentally, the same problem
was addressed in the United States by the publication at about the same time of my own study, Sundberg,
Belligerent Occupation and the Geneva Protocol, 1977: A Swedish Perspective, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
67 (1978). The most extensive study on these matters in Sweden was authored by the holders of the three
chairs in International Law, Professors Halvar Sundberg (Uppsala), Hilding Eek (Stockholm) and Erik
Fahlbeck (Lund), in 1956 under the title THE NORWEGIAN PURGE, H. EEK, E. FAHLBECK, & H. SUNDBERG,
DEN NORSKA RXTTSUPPGORELSEN - RESPONSUM OCH UTREDNING, (1956) (Institutet fr offentlig och
internationell rgtt nr. 18).
"Regrettably, Dr. Roberts had no command of the Scandinavian or Finnish languages and could read
neither German nor Russian. Consequently, his contribution had to be based exclusively on the literature
published in English, and he was forced to forego any insight into the discussion that had taken place
in the local languages. Paradoxically, that discussion is mirrored in my earlier article. See, Sundberg, supra
note 9.
Spring, 19831
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Atle Grahl Madsen, was asked to serve on the Committee as expert in interna-
tional law. Grahl Madsen, at that time, held the professorship of International
Law at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. In 1980, Commander Torgil Wulff
- another member of the Committee - was appointed honorary doctor at
the same university. The extensive Committee membership - 17 people - join-
ed in enthusiastic support of Dr. Blix' achievements.
The first result of the Committee work was a report, published in 1979,
with a compilation of international law documents.' 2 This report has a telling
preface, expressing the don't-rock-the-boat mentality. In making no mention
of the perception of International Law in the Socialist Camp, the report cor-
responds closely to the Manual on International Law for the Armed Forces,
that was issued in 1970, a work of Commander Wulff and Professor Stig
Jgerskilld.' 3 I found, at that time, reason to criticize this Manual for exactly
that very shortcoming. 4 In meeting the criticism, Commander Wulff made
a startling confession: If my criticism was to be taken seriously, almost every
page of the Manual would have to be rewritten.'I Mutatis mutandis the same
evidently applies to the 1979 report. It cannot be considered very helpful when
you consider a conflict involving Socialist Camp powers.
In the following I will discuss with an eye on specific Swedish difficulties,
some of the problems hiding in the Geneva Protocols. After an introductory
section dealing with the problem of treaty compliance, I will focus on two cases
which should show how one's vision can be limited by one's background without
knowing it. This should bring out the differences between an American percep-
tion, a Swedish perception, and a Socialist Camp perception. Much too often
it is the perception of the other party that is missing in your own analysis.
Hopefully, an exercise like this will contribute to a better understanding.
II. THE PROBLEM OF TREATY COMPLIANCE
Let us look for a moment at Article 80 in Protocol 1. 6 The 2nd paragraph
looks like this:
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall give
orders and instructions to ensure observance of the Conventions and this
Protocol, and shall supervise their execution.
The natural way to do this would seem to be by including the relevant
"Konventionssamling utgiven av folkrattshkommitten, Krigets Lagar, Folkrattsliga konventioner gillande
under krig, neutralitet och ockupation, 1979 STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR 73.
"S. JXGERSKIOLD AND T. WULFF, HANDBOK I FOLKRATT UNDER NEUTRALITET OCH KRIG, (1970). This manual
was approved by the Commander in Chief in December 1970. A second edition carrying the same title
but authored by Torgil Wulff alone, was published in 1980. It does not seem to have received the approval
of the Commander in Chief.
"Sundberg, En handbok ifolkrattfor svenska krigsmakten?, 1972 TIDSKRIFT I SJO5VASENDET 205, (Institutet
f~r offentlig och internationell ritt n.r. 36).
"Wulff, Olika tokningar av folkratten, 1972 TIDSKRIFT I SJOVASENDET 384, 387 ff.
"ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 6, Protocal I, art. 80, para. 2.
[Vol. 16:4
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provisions of the treaties in the penal law of each country. But that approach
is not without problems.
Many people envisage what is spelled out in international treaties as a body
of law common to all nations. But the penal law of modern countries does
not correspond to this notion. It is positivist. There is only the penal law of
each nation.
When you engage in an armed conflict, undisputably there will be com-
mitted many acts that correspond to what is called, in the penal code, murder,
assault, unlawful deprivation of liberty, and so forth. In the law of nations,
there are doctrines to the effect that acts of war are not, as a matter of princi-
ple, unlawful as such, although they may coincide with the descriptions of crimes
in the penal codes. The joining of these international law doctrines with the
penal codes of the various countries thus is a matter of the greatest interest.
Professor Johs. Andenaes" has this to say on that count:
In formulating a penal provision, not every special circumstance which
may be of importance in characterizing the prohibited act can be taken
into consideration. Thus, it sometimes happens that an act is covered by
the description of a penal provision, but nevertheless is not punished. A
ground of impunity exists. § 233 imposes punishment upon "anybody
who causes a person's death, or is accessory thereto." This may seem clear
enough. But by its terms the enactment applies not only to the usual
murderer, but also to . . . the solder who kills the enemy in wartime.
Numerically these legalized homicides have played a much larger role than
criminal ones in Europe during the past century."I
The doctrine of justification which we meet here belongs to the general
part of the penal law. The general part, again, was a creation of the nineteenth
century when the problems common to most crimes in the continental European
penal codes were brought together for regulation in such a part. The problems
of justification were among them, but they seldom received more than fragmen-
tary codification. Andenaes elaborates:
Not all grounds of impunity are set out in the Code ...
To decide whether an act falls within a penal provision but should
be treated as nonpunishable because of some special ground of impuni-
ty, or regarded as outside the statutory provision in the first place, may
be a matter of discretion in many instances.1 9
Turning now to Sweden, the surprising thing is that there is no provision
in the penal code that says explicitly that acts of war are not criminal homicides.
"1J. ANDENAES, THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY (1965).
"Id. at 143.
'Id. at 143-44.
Spring, 19831
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If, under Swedish law, war is a ground of impunity, that is at best something
implicit. The matter came to a head when the Ombudsman was asked by a
Communist sympathizer to see to it that penal action was taken against a Swedish
citizen who, having enlisted in the U.S. Army, had killed enemies in the course
of combat duty in Vietnam. The Ombudsman said: "A participant in war who
kills in combat an enemy is, in principle, according to international law doc-
trines, not liable to punishment for such act."" °
It is easy to agree with the Ombudsman. But the paucity of the argument
advanced in support of the combat action of the young Swede illustrates also
Professor Andenaes' statement that the whole thing is "a matter of discretion
in many instances."
Having this in mind one should recall that the Socialist Camp has long
developed a number of well-conceived Marxist doctrines, often entered into
the constitutions, which render service in the same or perhaps a better way
than does the Ombudsman's reasoning."1
Consequently, ensuring observance of the Convention and the Protocols
is, it would seem, more a problem of allowing the treaty in defense against
criminal action, than using the treaty as a ground of incrimination. One may
say though, that by using the treaty as a ground for incrimination, the conclu-
sion is strengthened that acts of war somehow implicitly benefit from a special
ground of impunity. In the following sections, I will try to illustrate how it
works in the Swedish setting.
These basic difficulties, of course, do not detract from the value of having
a good command of the contents of the Additional Protocols. On this point
too, the Swedish Committee has been active. In pursuance of its general policy
it was determined to weed out, from all teaching positions and from all men-
tion in bibliographies, the skeptics whatever their previous contributions.
By order of January 27, 1981, the Commander in Chief ordered that all per-
sonnel should have received, before July 1, 1983, such instruction in international
law as was necessary to enable them to fulfill their combat duties in times of
war. 22 The critical discussion being prevented and the only people remaining
available being the members of the Committee, they undertook graciously to
perform this duty of instruction.
III. POLICE ACTION AND TRANSFORMATION THEORY
In the aftermath of the Nuremberg trials, Sweden introduced a provision
in the Penal Code, now to be found in Chapter 22, § 11 of the Penal Code
of 1962. It reads in part:
"JO dnr 1518/68, (Aug. 23, 1968).
"A discussion of such matters is to be found in XI Congress of the International Association of Penal
Law, General Report on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 6 ARKIv. FOR LUFTRETr 1, 50-52 (Oslo, 1974).
"Utbildning i folkritt inom f6rsvarsmakten, TFG nr 810018, (January 27, 1981), 6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 2
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A person, who in the conduct of war, by using means of warfare
likely to cause unnecessary suffering or by misusing the Red Cross sign,
or otherwise, acts in a manner contrary to existing treaties with foreign
powers or to generally recognized principles of international law, shall
be sentenced for crime against international law to imprisonment for at
most four years; . . .1
The section continues in the same style.
This is a legislative technique with interesting properties. The Swedish Bill
for the ratification of the Additional Protocols says that it follows from the
legislative technique that has been used in Chapter 22, section 11, of the Penal
Code, that once Sweden has ratified the two updating Protocols (which is now
done), these provisions will in principle also cover violations of the Protocols."'
This means that the Protocols are immediately applicable to the armed forces
in case of war. Moreover, they apply to everybody and not only to the military.
But we also have a civilian side and there the rule is the opposite - or
at least it is being said that the rule is the opposite (because such statements
do not go unchallenged in legal scholarship)." 5 The Supreme Administrative
Court in 1974 rendered a judgment attempting to make the alleged rule stick.
The pivotal passage of the judgment reads like this:
An international agreement to which Sweden has adhered is not directly
applicable in the domestic administration of justice: instead, those legal
provisions that are to be found in the treaty must be included in a Swedish
statute in order to be valid law in our country (transformation). There
has been enacted no such statute of transformation with regard to Art.
2 of the Additional Protocol of March 20, 1952, to the Council of Europe's
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Consequently, no duty has arisen for the School Board to com-
ply with the rules of the Additional Protocol in its activities. 6
Thus, one rule says that the military is subject to all the provisions of all
existing treaties to which Sweden is a party, but on the civilian side, you have
exactly the opposite principle that says that no civilian authority is supposed
to know anything about the treaty obligations of Sweden. Evidently, this is
a rather dramatic situation.
When is Chapter 22, § in force? The answer to this question is that the
provision applies in case of war. However, it has been noted that war is illegal
"See, THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, Chap. 22, § 11 (T. Sellin, trans. 1972).
"Proposition 1978/79:77, p. 47.
2 A recent and extensive study is authored by B. Malmlof and M. Mellqvist and published in Chapter
2 of the volume STUDIER KRING EUROPA-KONVENTIONEN UTGIVNA AV INSTITUTET FOR OFFENTLIG OCH
INTERNATIONELL RITT (Institutet for offentlig och internationell r~tt nr 47), 43-56.
26Judgment of the Regeringsrdtten on June 28, 1974, in the so-called Ranea Case, 1974 REGERINGSRIT-rENS
ARSBOK, 121.
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according to the principles underlying the United Nations Organization, so there
cannot be a "war" in the legal sense.27 Wisely enough, therefore, an extra pro-
vision has been introduced saying that the section will also enter into force
when the Government says so.
Police forces tend to be militarily very useful in a pacific country like
Sweden. The police forces are on constant alert, they are well adapted to their
weapons, they shoot fast and hit the target. In realization of this and attemp-
ting to increase the efficiency of the armed forces, the Swedish police was in
1943 integrated with the military forces. However, in the wake of the Vietnam
War it became outmoded to be part of the military forces. This new sentiment
found a sympathetic response within the framework of the Council of Europe.
In addition to this more general movement, various police unions in Europe
turned out to be against the police forces being part of the military establishment.
As a result there was introduced in Sweden in 1979 a report proposing
that the police forces should be taken out of the military establishment and
should be made civilian forces.28 Roughly speaking, it is proposed that the police
should only answer for inner security and public order. Various political crises
have prevented the proposal from leaving the stage of a report only. However,
it would seem useful in this context to consider what the proposal may mean
in the context of the Swedish transformation theory29 and the Additional Pro-
tocols. In particular, Protocol II calls for consideration.
Protocol II is applicable as soon as armed conflict takes place between
Swedish armed forces and other armed groups which, "under responsible com-
mend, exercise such control over a part of [Swedish] territory as to enable them
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [Pro-
tocol 11].30 But the Protocol shall not apply to "situations of internal distur-
bances and tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature as not being armed conflicts." 3
This raises certain problems. If the military strikes at and subdues armed
groups of a guerilla character, perhaps one may hope that the Protocols will
be respected - at least if the military is well disciplined and the call for in-
struction and education has been adequately met. But "the activity of minor
groups," wrote Commander Wulff in 1972, "has nothing to do with wars of
liberation and can be met by police action." 32
A skeptic may doubt that the difference between the latter type of armed
17See, U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 33-37.
2
"Polisen i totalforsvanet, Betankande av 1975 ars polisutredning, 1979 STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR
75.
29See, supra, text accompanying note 26.
"AkDDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 6, Protocol I1, art. 1, para. 1.
"Id., para. 2.
"Wulff, supra note 15, at 386.
[Vol. 16:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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conflicts and "wars of liberation" is always so striking as some believe. Wulff,
it is true, was of the opinion that "in a society like the Swedish one with a
well developed Democratic government and a progressive social reform work,
the possibilities are very small that a bigger group can be made to participate
in such an action [as a 'war of liberation']." 33 The Government Bill pursues
the same line of thinking: national wars of liberation were "a type of conflict
that we are not likely to experience in our country"; 3 ' consequently, giving
more protection to guerilla soldiers was welcomed from the Swedish side. It
should not be left out of sight, however, that in Finland, a country much similar
to Sweden, the Second World War brought the experience of Communist guerilla
movements fighting their own government in that country. During the height
of the Vietnam War, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs tied the Swedish
Government to the principle "that the social progress and the national struggle
for liberation ... may not be met by military violence."" Seen in this perspec-
tive, it was not permissible to fight by military means the small units, a thou-
sand or so, who were fighting as "forest guerillas" in the Rusko woods out-
side Turku, Finland, and in other places for "social progress and national
liberation from the imperialist yoke of Capitalism." 3" The faith implicit in the
Bill seems less than convincing in a country having progressed, under the im-
pact of the Vietnam and the Chile propaganda, to every third student at the
University of Uppsala pleading allegiance to Communism.
Should it be up to the police to subdue such movements, the provisions
in Protocol II will enter the picture.
When the police are concerned, there is a notable difference between being
a civilian and being a military man. If you are a civilian, you are allowed to
use tear gas; if you are a military man, you are not.3" Let us assume that the
Swedish police will be allowed civilian status. Following the reasoning of the
Supreme Administrative Court,38 it does not need to consider the 1925 Pro-
tocol in their operations, because there is no transformation statute, and
according to the Government Bill, no such statute is needed.39 As long as they
are military men, however, pursuant to Ch. 22, sec. 11 of the Penal Code,
they are bound by the Protocol (provided that the chapter has been declared
in force).
3 Id.
"4Proposition 1978/79:77 s 39.
"61 SNABBPROTOKOLL FRAN RIKSDAGSDEBATrERNA 16 (1972).
"S.H. RATANEN, SOM POLITRUK I FINLAND, (Helsingfors 1958), 89 ff.
"Proceedings of the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting of American Society of International Law, Should
Weapons of Dubious Legality be Developed? 72 AM. Soc. INT'L LAW, 26, 27-29 (Remarks of Michael John
Matheson), 30-36 (Remarks of Hans Blix); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
TIAS No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
"See, supra text accompanying note 26.
"See, supra text accompanying note 24.
Spring, 1983]
9
Sundberg: Humanitarian Laws of Armed Conflict
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
The latter solution prevails so far. But the exercise is a reminder that in
many countries of the world, treaty law is not the law of the land and conse-
quently does not perform even half the wonders that people sitting in a coun-
try that proclaims treaties as the law of the land believe will take place due
to a new treaty.
IV. PRISONERS OF WAR AND SOCIALIST CAMP RESERVATIONS
Let us now turn to prisoners of war. Here, too, a limited vision may easily
corrupt the understanding of how this set of rules operates in practice.
The Marxist conception of law - which of course is the only permissible
one in the Socialist Camp - is of the universal kind. It is valid for all persons
everywhere. It includes a total conception of Law and State. That means all
law, including international law! All states, including the United States and
including Sweden! The Marxist message is, as it has been phrased by Professor
Gray Dorsey (the message is certainly still correct, although it was put together
by Dorsey on the basis of now slightly outdated Soviet manuals):
Every people and every nation has a right to self-determination. Self-
determination consists of a people or nation throwing off the imperialist
control of the bourgeois class. A people or nation that has thus exercised
its right of self-determination is then independent and equal with every
other people. When equal independent peoples or nations form a state,
popular and national sovereignty merge with state sovereignty, and any
subsequent attempt to induce a change in the social system or govern-
ment in that state is an infringement of state sovereignty. However, any
people or nation that has not exercised such self-determination [i.e., throw-
ing off the control of the bourgeois class imperialists] still has the right
to do so, and any subsequent attempt to induce a change of the social
system or government in that state is not an infringement of the sovereignty
of that state. 0
This is self-determination, a key word.
Furthermore, in Marxist thinking the Marxist theory is universal. It includes
a conception of Law and State, and that again includes a conception of the
penal law. Now, penal law, in the Marxist conception, is an instrument for
the repression of dangerous individuals. There is no question of justice or
anything like that: penal law is only a political instrument and it is going to
be used to suppress dangerous individuals. But dangerous individuals are not
all of the same kind. There appears a difference between the one who is active
in the private law field, and the one who is active in the public law field. The
petty thief is of the first kind, the political offender of the second kind. When
it comes to classifying who is the more dangerous of the two, well, then there
40Dorsey, Towards World Perspectives of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, CONTEMPORARY
CONCEPTIONS OF LAW, paper contributed to World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
- Contemporary Conceptions of Law. Basel (1979), 28.
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is no doubt about it: the political offender is the more dangerous one. So, as
regards offenders in the private sector, the Socialist conception of law allows
a very generous, and very tolerant approach; indeed, it is not really necessary
to punish the offender at all, because under the prevailing theory he is merely
under the influence of bad habits inherited from the bourgeois times. When
it comes to the political offender, on the other hand, he is a very dangerous
one. He is therefore the one who should be hit harder by the penal law."' And
the prisioner of war is, by definition, the most dangerous among political
offenders. I am not sure that this is realized everywhere. Sometimes I am inclined
to think that some people abhor the idea of making people realize it.
Certainly, if the prisoner of war is the political offender par prfe'rence,
one would like to know how that can be reconciled with the prisoner of war
privilege.
The privileged treatment of prisoners of war essentially goes back to the
end of the eighteenth century. It goes indeed back to the passage where Jean
Jacques Rousseau wrote:
War, then, is not a relation between men, but between states; in war
individuals are enemies wholly by chance, not as men, not even as citizens,
but only as soldiers; not as members of their country, but only as its
defenders. In a word, a state can have as an enemy only on another state,
not men, because there can be no real relation between things possessing
different intrinsic natures. 2
One had the right to kill the defenders of a state as long as they bore arms,
but when they surrendered they ceased to be enemies or instruments of the
enemy and became men. Their killing was unnecessary to achieve the purpose
of the war, i.e., the destruction of the enemy state."3
The success of this theory is very much explained by the fact that it har-
monized perfectly with what the state looked like in the nineteenth century,
the Liberal, nightwatchman state. The paradox of the situation is, of course,
that today when war is as total as the government being fought against, this
privilege remains. The chivalrous attitude finds its most manifest expression
in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
1949. 4 That is a paradox!
But Socialist Governments' ways with prisoners of war cannot reflect a
very chivalrous attitude, due to their basic conception of the relationship between
'Cf. H. BERMAN & J. SPINDLER, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - THE RSFSR CODES, 31 (1966).
4
2J. ROUSSEAU. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (M Cranston, trans. Penguin, 1968) 56 (1762).
'
3This attitude is reflected in Decree of May 4, 1792 of the French National Assembly Concerning Prisoners
of War, the contents of which are ascribed to the influence of Rousseau and Montesquieu by Howard
Levie. Levie, Documents on Prisoners of War, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, Vol.
60, 10 (1979); cf. A. Rosas, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 57 (1976).
"Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6.
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Law and State. The prisoner of war is the political offender par prfe'rence.
It should be recalled that in the Stalin era, prisoners of war were the big source
of forced labour.4 5 The German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were
almost all put through Russian proceedings in which they were sentenced for
having killed Russian citizens and having destroyed Russian property, which
was very definitely illegal according to the Russian penal laws." Of course,
it remains illegal, unless international law somehow allows a defense.
At this point, we must ask: what about the prisoner-of-war-convention?
The answer is that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, signed July 27, 1929,'7 was never adhered to by the Soviet Union.
The matter was not even discussed during the war.4 8 As a result, in these trials
international law was not allowed as a defense. So these prisoners of war were
just sentenced and sent to the forced-labour camps in Siberia where they re-
mained until 1955.4 9
Looking at the American experience with their military people being taken
prisoners of war in Korea, the following passage in a Congressional Report
should be recalled: "The Korean War made crystal clear that when our Nation
was engaged in hostilities with a Communist Far-Eastern country, the ques-
tion of 'prisoners of war' presented new and unprecedented problems." 5 It
is not necessary here to elaborate further, but there is more in that Report.
The U.S. Admiral Stockdale returning from North Vietnam, had first hand
experience of this. He put it as follows: "As POWs who were treated not as
POWs but as common criminals, we sailed unchartered waters."'"
The Socialist Camp states have all made reservations to Article 85 in the
Third Convention of 1949." This Article proclaims that
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for
acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits
of the present Convention."
These benefits to which the article refers, may seem slightly limited, such
"Cunningham, The Origins and Development of Communist Prisoner of War Policies, JOURNAL OF THE
ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES, 38, 39 (1974).
"'See R. MAURACH, DIE KRIEGSVERBRECHERPROZESSE GEGEN DEUTSCHE GEFANGENE IN DER SOWJETUNION,
(1950); and P. CARFLL & G. B5DDEKER, DIE GEFANGENE. LEBEN UND UBERLEBEN DEUTSCHER SOLDATEN
HINTER STACHELDRAHT, 354 ff. (1980).
"4Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S.
No. 846, (Replaced by: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6.)
"R. MAURACH, supra note 46, at 20; A. ROSAS, supra note 43, at 57.
"For detail, see P. CXRELL & G. B96DDEKER, supra note 46 at 363.
"Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, Report of the Special Subcommittee on
the U.S.S. Pueblo of the Committee on Armed Service, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
1684 (1969).
" Stockdale, Experiences as a POW in Vietnam, 1975 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, 5.
"See, e.g., I.C.R.C., THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949: COMMENTARY 423-25 (Pictet ed. 1960).
"Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 6, art. 85.
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as not being executed on the spot, or being allowed to receive gift parcels. There
may, however, be another benefit going with the Convention although it is
not spelled out but only implicit: impunity in criminal proceedings based on
the international law doctrine of acts of war. Governments having made reser-
vations to this Article remain able to apply their penal law - in the Stalin
tradition - to prisoners of war. Prisoner of war status will not prevent such
trials from taking place.
At the new Geneva Conference, nothing was changed in this respect. The
matter was raised by Art. 65 of Draft Protocol 1.11 The Soviet delegation
explained:
As the Soviet delegation understands Article 65, its effects do not extend
to war criminals and spies. National legislation should apply to this category
of persons, and they should not enjoy international protection. We should
like to recall in this connection the reservation which the USSR made to
Article 85 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners
of war."
The delegation concluded: "The position thus taken by the USSR remains
unchanged." 5
6
One may consequently fear that the treatment a prisoner of war may ex-
pect in the hands of a Socialist Camp power is no better than the one that
is afforded the "mercenary" condemned in Art. 47 of Protocol L" It testifies
to the difficulties facing the Swedish Committee that it has felt that the Swedes
can do without any information on this point in the Report. Judging from
the discussion of the Angola trial and the case of Captain Astiz in Swedish
mass media,58 the Swedish general public would be overly optimistic if they
expected to get more information on the point from media.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the present contribution has been to present some view-
points on some of the key issues addressed at the Diplomatic Conference. There
is no denying that advances have been made, perhaps important ones. Yet some
of the solutions arrived at no doubt call less for praise than for surprise. Those
surprised may ask how such an enormous effort as this monster conference
taking place after such prolonged preparations gave such a yield.
The monster congress itself provides most of the answer. A gathering of
people of this type is simply incapable of achieving results which will always
4I.C.R.C. DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCALS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUG. 1949, art. 65 (1973).
"16 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS 277 (1978).
6Id., at 278.
"ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 6 Protocal I I art. 47, para. 1: "A mercenary shall not have the right
to be a combattant or a prisoner of war."
"See, supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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stand up to critical intellectual analysis. It is easy to join George H. Aldrich
when he summarizes: "For everyone involved, there is a growing conviction
that the multilateral law-making conference is the least efficient and most diffi-
cult machinery ever developed by the art of diplomacy." 9 In this setting, what
a solution really meant became much less important than the headway it could
make at the monster congress. And after the congress, the whole advantage
could be lost by important countries adding reservations or refusing to sign.
Translating results of this kind into practical implementation in a local
setting, the glamour of the "consensus in the international community" quickly
fades away. The party is over: it is time for realities. The first and foremost
reality of a state is its location. That will not change, whatever your sympathies
and antipathies. The location normally determines what people are to be faced
as allies or adversaries. Their perception of the world and how it works belongs
to the reality of the location. To understand that is of the greatest importance.
It has been my hope to have contributed something to that understanding.
"Aldrich, Establishing Legal Norms Through Multilateral Negotiation: The Laws of War, 9 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 9 (1977); cf. J. Sundberg, The Wisdom of Treaty-Making Treaties. A Glance at the
Machinery Behind the Production of Law-Making andA Case Study of the Hague Hijacking Conference
of 1970. 1972 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW, 283 (1972).
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